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Comments
WHAT EFFECT HAS PROOF OF MATERNITY
Recent scientific discoveries have introduced reliable methods
of proving maternal descent. When children are born in hospi-
tals, each infant's footprints are taken and all birthmarks and
defects are noted, in addition to an indentification wrist or ankle
band. The use of fingerprints and footprints is no longer in an
experimental stage of scientific investigation, but has been legally
accepted as proof of identity. In this way a child is able to con-
clusively prove that he is "identically the same person as the
child whom the mother brought forth."'.
It is now timely to determine of what value this proof of
maternal descent will be to an illegitimate child who has not
been acknowledged, even informally, by his mother. Suppose
that when C, an illegitimate child, was just a few weeks old, his
mother placed him in an orphanage or some similar private in-
stitution. Being from a prominent and wealthy family, the moth-
er did not wish it to be known that she had borne an illegitimate
child; so, although she paid to have C kept in the institution, she
never openly acknowledged him in any manner whatsoever. The
name of the mother and child was kept in confidential files, and
the hospital where the child was born had records of the birth
consisting of date, name, et cetera. Several years later the mother
died and C asks to be recognized as the natural child of deceased
upon proving his maternal descent by the aforesaid files and
hospital records. Should the court hold that this proof of ma-
ternity elevated C to the status of a natural child and as such
allow him to inherit; or would this proof have no effect on C's
status, in which case he would be simply an illegitimate child
with his rights confined to alimony?2 The main question is wheth-
er proof of maternity is a good substitute for acknowledgment
so as to enable the child to inherit from the mother as a natural
child. Before this question can be answered categorically it is
necessary to look into the background and discuss certain prob-
lems that have arisen in this connection.
1. Art. 212, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Art. 920, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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Illegitimate Child-Method of Acknowledgment
"The acknowledgment of an illegitimate child shall be
made by a declaration executed before a notary public, in
presence of two witnesses, by the father 'and mother or either
of them, whenever it shall not have been made in the regis-
tering of the birth or baptism of such child."
This article presents a question of great importance and one
which has been the subject of much controversy: whether the
acknowledgment of an illegitimate child, to enable the child to
inherit, can be made in any other mode than as provided for by
Article 203.
Some of the older cases held that the formal acknowledg-
ment required by Article 203 is that of the father and that ac-
knowledgment by the mother could be shown by any legal evi-
dence.4 However, this distinction has not survived and the later
cases have held that the same rules regarding the modes of ac-
knowledgment apply to both father and mother." With this in
mind, the next step is to determine whether or not Article 203 is
exclusive.
There are two divergent lines of jurisprudence on this point
-one holding that Article 203 is positive and mandatory as to
the methods of acknowledgment; 6 the other holding that said
article does not stand alone but that the Code expressly permits
other modes of proof, both of paternal and maternal descent.7
It seems unnecessary to state here the reasons for allowing in-
formal acknowledgment, or the reasons for requiring that it be
formal in one of the methods provided by Article 203, because
3. Art. 203, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. Jobert v. Pitot, 4 La. Ann. 305 (1849); Succession of Hebert, 33 La.
Ann. 1099 (1881); Austin v. Mattle, 4 Orl. App. 148 (La. 1907).
5. Hart v. Hoss and Elder, 26 La. Ann. 90 (1874); Bourriaque v. Charles,
107 La. 217, 31 So. 757 (1902). Succession of Corsey, 171 La. 663, 131 So. 841
(1930).
6. Succession of Lacosst, 142 La. 673, 77 So. 497 (1917) (mother was at-
tempting to inherit the estate of her illegitimate child); Perkins v. Brownell-
Drews Lbr. Co., 147 La. 337, 84 So. 894 (1920) (parents attempting to inherit
from illegitimate child); Minor v. Young, 149 La. 583, 89 So. 757 (1921) (child-
ren attempting to inherit from mother).,
7. Lange v. Richoux, 6 La. 560 (1334); Jobert v. Pitot, 4 La. Ann. 305
(1849); Succession of Fortier, 51 La.' Ann. 1562, 1585 (1899); Bourriaque v.
Charles, 107 La. 217, 31 So. 757 (1902); Succession of Gravier, 125 La. 733,
51 So. 704 (1910); Briggs v. McLaughlin, 134 La. 133, 63 So. 851 (1913); Taylor
v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635 (1922); Murdock v. Potter, 155 La. 145, 99 So.
18 (1923); Succession of Falls, 2 La. App. 759 (1925); Succession of Corsey,
171 La. 663, 131 So. 841 (1930); Succession of Jones, 185 La. 377, 169 So. 440
(1936); Succession of Tyson, 186 La. 516, 172 So. 772 (1937); Fennell v. United
States, 67 F.(2d) 768 (C.C.A. 5th, 1933).
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both sides of the question have been treated exhaustively in the
cases of Minor v. Young8 and Taylor v. Allen,' the latter holding
that informal acknowlegment is sufficient to change the status
of an illegitimate child to that of an acknowledged natural child.
Several years later in Succession of Corsey ° the court held that
an illegitimate child was entitled to inherit from her father sim-
ply upon proof of her paternity. Therefore, there is no question
as to the effect of proof of paternal descent, and a child making
such proof would, at the same time, be proving informal ac-
knowledgment. Such child would then be classified as a natural
child and Article 920, pertaining to unacknowledgable illegiti-
mates who can receive nothing more than alimony, would not
apply to him. Instead, his rights to inherit would be determined
by Article 919. But proof of maternal descent, unlike proof of
paternity, does not include acknowledgment of any kind. It
might even be said that proof of maternity is much more difficult
to make than proof of informal acknowledgment. Article 212
reads:
"Illegitimate children of every description may make proof of
their maternal descent, provided the mother be not a married
woman.
"But the child who will make such proof shall be bound
to show that he is identically the same person as the child
whom the mother brought forth."
How would one go about this task? The expression generally
found is that illegtimate children may prove their maternal des-
cent by any legal or competent evidence.1 1 Such proof involves
proof of the accouchment and the bringing forth of the child
and then proof of the identity of the claimant with the child so
brought forth.12 In the case of Lange v. Richoux8 it was said that
under the Eleventh law of Toro, which was in force before the
Code of 1808, it was considered by the ablest commentators that
proof of birth was equivalent to acknowledgment on the part of
8. 149 La. 583, 89 So. 757 (1921). See dissenting opinion.
9. 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635 (1922). See dissenting opinion. Also see Comment
(1931) 6 Tulane L. Rev. 120, and Oppenheim, Acknowledgment and Legiti-
mation in Louisiana-Louisiana Act 50 of 1944 (1945) 19 Tulane L. Rev. 325.
10. 171 La. 663, 131 So. 841 (1930).
11. Jobert v. Pitot, 4 La. Ann. 305 (1849); Austin v. Mattle, 4 Orl. App.
148 (La. 1907); Succession of Davis, 126 La. 178, 52 So. 266 (1910); Fennell
v. U. S., 67 F.(2d) 768 (1933).
12. Succession of Berfuse, 34 La. Ann. 599 (1882).
13. 6 La. 560 (1884).
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the mother. Also that under the Code Napoleon it was the
consensus of opinion among the commentators that proof of ma-
ternity is a forced acknowledgment and has the same effect as
the voluntary one in authentic form. Before this rule can be up-
held under the present law, Article 918 presents a point that must
be disposed of. This article provides that "natural children are
called to the legal succession of their natural mother, when they
have been duly acknowledged by her ... ." It is true that in the
case postulated there was no public recognition of the child C,
but "duly acknowledged" does not necessarily mean by notarial
act or in the birth or baptismal certificate.14 Methods of acknowl-
edgment include proof of paternal and maternal descent.15
A thorough search of the cases dealing with proof of ma-
ternal descent fails to reveal any wherein an illegitimate child
was attempting to inherit from his mother simply by proving
his maternity., There are expressions on this point, but they must
be considered as dicta only because the factual situation is differ-
ent. Upon evidence that plaintiff's mother and her deceased sister
were daughters of the same woman, the sisters were classified
as natural children and plaintiffs 'were allowed to inherit from
deceased. 16 In a later case,' 7 proof of maternal descent was offered
on behalf of the mother to entitle her to inherit the estate of her
illegitimate child. It was held that the mother was not an heir
at law since the Code18 does not provide for proof of maternal
descent by or on behalf of the mother. In Succession of Gravier9
14. Comment (1931) 6 Tulane L. Rev. 120.
15. Lange v. Richoux, 6 La. 560 (1834); Succession of Davis, 126 La. 178,
52 So. 266 (1910); Briggs v. McLaughlin, 134 La. 133, 63 So. 851 (1913); Taylor
v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635 (1922); Oppenheim, supra note 9, at 328: "the rule
which is becoming well established is that in order for the child to inherit
from the parents informal acknowledgment is all that is necessary....
proof of paternal and maternal filiation have practically been substituted
for the formal acknowledgment."
16. Lange v. Richoux, 6 La. 560, 570 (1834): "the Code expressly permits
other modes of proof both of paternal and maternal descent without any
restriction as to the purpose for which it may be allowed."
17. Succession of Lacosst, 142 La. 673, 77 So. 497 (1917). There was also
informal acknowledgment in this case, and the decision was based on the
fact that there must be formal acknowledgment according to Article 203
before a parent could inherit from his illegitimate child. Provosty, J., con-
curs on the ground that while the child may prove acknowledgment in a
mode other than either of those expressly provided for by the Code, the
mother may not. In accord: Perkins v. Brownell-Drews Lbr. Co., 147 La.
337, 84 So. 894 (1920); Wells v. White-Grandin Lbr. Co., Inc., 13 La. App. 696,
129 So. 171 (1930).
18. La. Civil Code of 1870.
19. 125 La. 733, 51 So. 704 (1910), where it was held that brothers and
sisters cannot inherit from a deceased sister simply on proof of maternal
descent. Acknowledgment is a prerequisite. The brothers and sisters cannot
19451
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the court flatly stated that an illegitimate child could not inherit
from his mother by proving only that she was his mother; she
must recognize him in one of the ways pointed out by law. How-
ever, that was not the issue involved in the case, so the statement
can be accorded very little weight. Several times the court has
made definite statements indicating that proof of maternal des-
cent alone can be substituted for acknowledgment by the mother
and that such proof would be sufficient to elevate an illegitimate
child to the status of a natural child, thereby having the same
effect as acknowledgment and allowing the child to inherit.20
In 1933, the federal court had occasion to pass upon the point
under discussion and, after reading the codal provisions and re-
viewing the jurisprudence of Louisiana, came to the conclusion
that an illegitimate child, at least as respects his right to inherit
from his mother, may have what is called a "forced acknowledg-
ment." This occurs when the child proves the actual relationship
under Article 212 by any appropriate evidence.
2 1
Who May Make Proof of Maternal Descent
"Illegitimate children of every description may make proof
of their maternal descent, provided the mother be not a mar-
ried women."22
This article presents a point that could be used as an argu-
ment against the proposition that proof of maternity should be
equivalent to informal acknowledgment of the mother. It might
be said that even adulterous and incestuous children would be
be in a better position than the father and mother and since the latter could
not inherit from their children because of the absence of acknowledgment,
then the children inherit no right from their parents to the deceased sister's
estate.
20. Lange v. Richoux, 6 La. 560 (1834); Jobert v. Pitot, 4 La. Ann. 305
(1849); Succession of Davis, 126 La. 178, 52 So. 266 (1910); Briggs v. Mc-
Laughlin, 134 La. 133, 63 So. 851 (1913): "In Succession of Davis, the cases
of Lange v. Richoux and Jobert v. Pitot are cited and quoted as authority
for the proposition, the soundness of which is not questioned, that natural
children may prove their maternal descent by any legal evidence, and that
such proof is equivalent to acknowledgment."
21. Fennell v. United States, 67 F.(2d) 768 (1933). No mention was made
of any acknowledgment whatsoever. It was simply conceded that the mother
was unmarried and that plaintiff and deceased were her identical children.
Plaintiff was allowed to inherit from his deceased brother upon such proof.
The court said that by this "forced acknowledgment" they proved them-
selves, as respects the mother, to be natural brothers and sisters within
Article 923.
22. Art. 212, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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allowed to inherit from the mother under such circumstances,
but there are two answers to the argument: First, illegitimate
children can prove their maternal descent only in case the moth-
er is not a married woman; and second, if it were possible to
prove that the father was a married man or that the child was
an incestuous illegitimate, the prohibition against such children
inheriting is found in Article 920.
The only remaining argument left is to the effect that the
Code article provides that only natural children, duly acknowl-
edged by their mother, can inherit from her. As stated before,
only a few cases have required this acknowledgment to be formal
as provided in Article 203, and in those cases that have accepted
informal acknowledgment as being sufficient the holding is based
on the fact that the Code does provide for other modes of ac-
knowledgment, namely, proof of paternity and maternal descent.
This is, undoubtedly, an acceptance of the idea that proof of
maternal descent is one of the modes of informal acknowledment,
and it therefore seems logical that such proof would have the
same effect as does the public recognition of an illegitimate child
by his natural mother, which is simply another mode of informal
ackrowledgment.
It could hardly be said that this result would overthrow the
social policy behind the problem, because the parents of the il-
legitimate child certainly should be, and supposedly are, the ones
to suffer. The acceptance of proof of maternal descent as one of
the modes of informal acknowledgment does not allow any
greater benefits to the natural mother because the Code does not
provide for such proof on her behalf. The modern trend of the
cases and legislative action2  is to allow all possible rights to this
unfortunate class of children. The right of proving maternal des-
cent belongs only to those children who could have been legally
acknowledged, therefore it is not introducing a new class entitled
to inherit from the mother, but is only giving the same class an
additional method of proving acknowledgment. The fact that a
mother has not been decent enough to hold her child out to the
public as her own should not be held against the child and serve
to deprive him of an inheritance that is rightfully his.
BETTY ANN GREMILLION
23. Art. 918, La. Civil Code of 1870.
24. La. Act 50 of 1944.
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